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TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES OF ROBERT F. TURNERt
1. Has modern warfare rendered the Geneva Conventions quaint?
I don't think so. Throughout history, methods, tools, and principles
of warfare have changed to meet new threats, exploit new technologies,
and embody the moral principles of the time. The '49 Conventions were
designed primarily to address the experiences of World War II, and are
subject to change.' But the core principle that noncombatants and
combatants who have been seriously wounded or captured by their
enemies ought to be treated humanely strikes me as being as valid today
as it was in 1949.
2. Is the Justice Jackson concurrence in the Steel Seizure case really
that helpful in sorting out separation-of-powers questions?
There is a great deal of confusion about what Jackson was trying to
say in Youngstown. In footnote 2, he carefully distinguished the case
from the controlling paradigm governing foreign affairs and external
relations, the 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision. Properly understood,
Youngstown had nothing to do with the constitutional powers of
Congress or the President to conduct diplomacy, gather foreign
intelligence, or conduct war outside our borders. Rather, it involved a
f In addition to teaching at both the undergraduate and law school level at the
University of Virginia, Dr. Turner is a former Charles H. Stockton Professor of
International Law at the Naval War College. He chaired the ABA Standing Committee
on Law and National Security from 1989-1992 and served for many years as editor of the
ABA National Security Law Report. Author or editor of more than fifteen books, he has
been a witness before more than a dozen different committees of Congress-including
three appearances before the Senate Judiciary Committee during the past fourteen
months.
1. See, e.g., Protocol Additional (No. 1) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional (No. 2) to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)("That case [Curtiss-Wright] does not solve the present
controversy. It recognized internal and external affairs as being in separate categories
... )
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claim by the President to be able to seize and operate privately-owned
steel mills in this country for the purpose of insuring that labor strikes
would not affect the ability of the military to obtain steel to use in the
Korean War. Thus, Youngstown was less of a "war powers" or "foreign
affairs" case than a Fifth Amendment case. That Amendment guarantees
that "No person ... shall be deprived of... property without due process
of law . . . ." Both Justice Black for the Court majority and Justice
Jackson in his famous concurring opinion repeatedly emphasized that
they were not seeking to limit presidential power dealing with the
external world, but rather were only addressing domestic issues. See also
the concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice
Burger and two other members of the Court) in Goldwater v. Carter,
which rejected Senator Goldwater's claim that Youngstown ought to
resolve a dispute over presidential power to terminate a mutual security
treaty with Taiwan because Goldwater, like Curtiss-Wright, was a
foreign affairs case.3
3. Have the executive branch's recent assertions of the state secrets
privilege broken from the doctrinal moorings of the Reynolds
decision?
I am not sure I have followed all of the assertions, but those of
which I am aware seem consistent with the Reynolds' holding that "even
the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if
the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." 4 That
case involved alleged "military secrets," but the same principle clearly
applies to intelligence and diplomatic secrets. As Chief Justice Marshall
explained in Marbury v. Madison:
By the constitution of the United States, the president is
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise
of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable
only to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience .... [A]nd whatever opinion may be entertained of
the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.
The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not
individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the
decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this
remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress for
3. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05 (1979).
4. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
1606 [Vol. 33:5
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establishing the department of foreign affairs .... 5
In Curtiss-Wright, the Court added with respect to presidential power
over foreign affairs:
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external
affairs in origin and essential character different from that over
internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is
significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great
argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives,
"The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.
' 6
Since Vietnam, we have lost sight of these important principles and
Congress has often broken the law (the higher law of the Constitution) in
its efforts to usurp or control executive discretion.
Now, obviously, the Constitution is not suspended during wartime
or national emergency, and neither Congress nor the President may use
their legitimate powers in such a manner as to usurp powers given by the
people to another department of government or rights guaranteed to the
people. The Fourth Amendment, for example, remains fully in force
during the "War on Terror"-but what constitutes an "unreasonable
search or seizure" may well change as the threat to the nation changes
from peace to war. During wartime, I believe both courts and Congress
ought to be especially deferential to the executive, but if the courts
perceive that individual rights are being clearly trampled, I don't think
Reynolds precludes all inquiry. But even when a claim involves the
possibility of a civil liberties violation (e.g., where a plaintiff alleges that
without access to highly-classified information she can't tell whether
someone's civil liberties might be being violated), as a prudential matter
courts ought to be cautious about compelling the disclosure of
information that might ultimately compromise sensitive sources and
methods of intelligence gathering, weaken the war effort, and ultimately
perhaps cost many thousands of American lives. Just as by allowing the
Commander-in-Chief to authorize a lieutenant to exercise battlefield
discretion about where to direct mortar fire without prior judicial or
5. 5 U.S. 137, 165-66 (1803).
6. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
2007] 1607
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legislative authorization we run an increased risk that innocent lives may
be lost as a result of bad intelligence (the building being targeted may
turn out to be the location of a wedding rather than an al Qaeda safe
house) or poor execution (the private aiming the device may dial in the
wrong coordinates), we have to be willing to tolerate some additional
risks to our civil liberties rather than impose elements of delay in the
war-fighting process that may easily jeopardize operational success and
lead to the deaths of thousands or even the loss of freedom for all
Americans.
4. Should any responsibility for gathering domestic intelligence
remain with the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation?
If you are talking about gathering foreign intelligence information
from targets located within the United States (e.g., engaging in
surveillance of an Egyptian national lawfully in the United States on a
student visa but believed by authorities to be an al Qaeda agent planning
an attack on the Capitol Building), I share John Jay's view voiced in
Federalist No. 64 that the Constitution left "the business of intelligence"
to be managed entirely by the President "as prudence might suggest."
Thus, this is a decision for the President to make. If asked for my
opinion by the President, I would favor making full use of the talents and
resources of the FBI in this task. If you are talking about gathering
information on purely domestic groups that have no ties to foreign
powers or their causes, both Congress and the courts have a proper role
here. But there, too, I believe the FBI has an important role to play in
addition to their law enforcement responsibilities.
5. Does Congress have the authority, if so inclined, to regulate
wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes outside United States
territory?
No. This power was vested exclusively in the President, and when
Congress attempts to usurp that power, it violates the law. To again
quote Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury: "[A] legislative act
contrary to the constitution is not law .. . .[A]n act of the legislature
repugnant to the constitution is void."
7
I worked in the Senate when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978. Historically, as I documented in my
testimony last year before the Senate Judiciary Committee, all three
7. 5 U.S. at 177.
1608 [Vol. 33:5
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branches of government recognized that collecting foreign intelligence
information was an exclusive presidential role. 8 When the Supreme
Court in Katz v. United States9 declared that wiretapping was a "seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment and thus required a warrant, it espressly
excluded from the holding foreign intelligence collection by authority of
the President. And when Congress implemented this holding by enacting
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, it
expressly provided that "Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary ... to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States."
In the 1972 United States v. United States District Court (the Keith
case) case, the Supreme Court held that for purely domestic national
security wiretaps-involving groups like the Black Panthers, that had no
ties to foreign powers-a warrant would be required. 10  As a result,
Congress might have wanted to enact a new law setting standards for
such domestic national security wiretap warrants (which might be lower
than those required for normal law enforcement wiretaps). But Congress
was already heady with its raid on presidential power in the wake of
Vietnam, and it elected instead to enact a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, seizing powers it had long recognized to have been
vested in the President by the Constitution.
Among other consequences of this illegal power grab may have
been the success of the attacks of 9/11. Former National Security
Agency (NSA) Director General Michael Hayden has stated publiclyII
that had the terrorist surveillance program been in effect in 2001, the
NSA probably would have located some of the 9/11 terrorists and
identified them as such. But FISA made it a felony for a U.S.
intelligence officer to "spy" on foreign nationals in this country in
violation of FISA.
Similarly, Time named FBI lawyer Coleen Rowley one of its
"Persons of the Year" in 2002 for the scathing memo she wrote FBI
Director Robert Mueller because the national security law unit of the FBI
Office of General Counsel had refused to even request a FISA warrant so
she could search the contents of Zacharias Moussaoui's laptop computer.
8. Robert Turner, Statement Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (March
31, 2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?
id=1841 &wit id=5217.
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
11. Turner, supra note 8.
20071 1609
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She, like Time and several Senators who subsequently attacked the FBI
for its behavior, was clueless about the requirements of FISA, and did
not understand that Congress had failed to make any provisions for
surveillance of "lone wolf' terrorists like Moussaoui-terrorists who
may have been a serious threat to our security, but were not an "agent" or
employee of any foreign terrorist group. In December 2004, Congress
quietly amended FISA to correct this oversight.
6. What is the next step for the majority of the detainees in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
It seems clear that at least some of the reports of serious physical
abuse of some detainees are true, and if so, those incidents constitute war
crimes for which the interrogators and their superiors who knew, or
should have known, that abuse was taking place will be vulnerable to
trial in any of more than 190 countries for the rest of their lives. This is a
great tragedy.
One of the many misunderstandings that have resulted from a
failure of many Americans to understand national security law, is that it
is standard practice during armed conflict to detain enemy combatants
for the duration of hostilities without access to legal counsel or a "day in
court." Detainees have a right to be treated humanely (a much higher
standard than just not to "torture" them), and if they are accused of war
crimes committed prior to being captured or common crimes while being
detained (e.g., attacking a guard or fellow detainee), they have a right to
certain minimum standards of due process-including a presumption of
innocence, right to legal counsel, right to be present and have the
proceedings translated into a language they can understand, and so forth.
But the Third Geneva Convention provides that any such trials are to be
conducted in military courts, not domestic courts. The trials may when
necessary be held in secret, and the death penalty is a lawful punishment
for some offenses.
We had nearly half-a-million German POWs detained in camps in
more than forty states across America during World War II without
access to lawyers or a day in court, and we did not complain when our
POWs in North Vietnam did not receive lawyers or a day in court. (We
did complain when we learned they were being tortured, and the world
community has every right to complain about any detainee abuse carried
out by Americans.)
My guess is that most of the detainees will eventually be sent back
to their countries of origin. A few may be held for intelligence purposes
1610 [Vol. 33:5
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longer, and a larger number of more fanatical detainees will be detained
for the duration simply because if let go they have the clear wish to come
to America and blow themselves up to kill as many Americans as
possible. But we are already down to about 300 "enemy detainees" at
Guantanamo, not counting about 85 who have been approved for transfer
home but that has not yet occurred. That's less than half the number of
detainees once held there. 12
It is expensive to maintain this facility, and I can't imagine anyone
who might want to detain anyone there longer than is necessary. But
some of them are truly fanatical and openly pledge that at the first
opportunity they will return to kill as many Americans as possible. It is
lawful for us to detain them for the duration and to try them before a
properly constituted military tribunal for any crimes they may have
committed. With the most fanatical, I believe it would be imprudent to
simply let them go. (Several of those already released have been
recaptured in Afghanistan fighting with al Qaeda.)
7. Between Hamdi and Hamdan, which decision is most significant?
Both are important cases, but if your name is not Hamdi or Hamdan,
I'm not sure it is easy to declare one or the other "most significant." I
think the Court got most of the issues right in both cases. But I think
Justices Scalia and Kennedy were correct in their conclusion that Hamdi
effectively reversed Eisentrager, which I felt was a good decision. I
think Justice Scalia, in his Hamdi dissent, also scored some strong points
with his critique of the majority's assessment of English recognition of
habeas corpus outside the kingdom involving foreign nationals. (I think
the majority confused cases involving British subjects outside the
kingdom with a situation involving foreigners in other countries.) But I
can't easily declare one opinion more significant than the other.
8. Between the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Director of National Intelligence, who should be responsible for
presenting covert action proposals to the National Security Council
and to the President?
This, again, is the President's call. I first met John Negroponte in
October 1984 in Honduras and have long been very impressed with him.
I am told that his successor is also an extraordinarily able individual.
12. See Press Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, United States
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Having said that, I have never been certain that adding a new layer of
bureaucracy was the best "fix" for some real problems we had in the
Intelligence Community (IC).
But given the new system, it seems to me that the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) is the key IC contact with the President and
thus the DNI is probably the person to take the lead in this role.
However, I can see situations in which he or she would want to be
accompanied by one or more experts from other parts of the IC in
making such a presentation in case detailed substantive questions arise.
9. Should Congress pass a law (along the lines of H.R. 4392,
Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2001) that makes the
"unauthorized disclosure of classified information" a crime?
I think yes. One of the reasons that protecting U.S. national security
is so important is because of our remarkable system of government. And
the First Amendment is a central part of that system. But (while I'm not
greatly offended by decisions extending its reach to "commercial
speech" and related areas), in my view the core of the First Amendment
is the protection of the right of everyone to express any political opinion
they wish. Even during wartime, journalists (and the rest of us) should
be free to denounce the war and everyone associated with it.
But there are certain things we ought to be able to protect. We
ought to be able to make it a crime to say, "This is a stickup, give me all
of the money" in a bank, or to falsely shout "fire" in a theater or crowded
stadium. Written or spoken words that promote fraud or other criminal
activities or pose an immediate threat to the safety of children ought also
to be actionable. And I think the government ought to be able to make it
a crime to knowingly give aid and comfort to an enemy (and our
Constitution clearly recognizes that right), or to publish the sailing dates
of troop transport ships, the codes used by our military, the names of
intelligence agents, and a variety of other national security information
as well.
During World War II, Ernie Pyle and most other American
journalists covering the war thought of themselves as "Americans" first
and understood that there was a difference between FDR and Hitler.
They wanted our side to win. Since Vietnam (actually it was very
evident during Vietnam), too many journalists seem to believe that it is
unprofessional to take sides in such matters and see their job as to write
whatever is necessary to move their story from page twenty-five to page
one (which is the path to Pulitzer prizes and promotions).
I first went to Vietnam in 1968 with a press card that allowed me to
1612 [Vol. 33:5
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travel the country and stay in U.S. military press centers at almost no
cost. (A bunk for the night cost well under $5, as I recall, and a nice T-
bone steak dinner at the local officers' club was $2.25.) One night I got
into a bit of an argument with a "real" journalist, and I pointed out that
his most recent stories had focused on mistakes or misconduct by
Americans with very little criticism of our enemy. He didn't disagree.
Instead, he replied-and after thirty-nine years I can't be sure my
memory is perfect, but this is close-"Bob, your problem is that you
don't understand journalism. I'm not interested in writing stories about
dogs biting men. I want to find stories about men biting dogs. Everyone
at home knows most of our soldiers are great kids who are serving
bravely and trying to do the right thing. And everyone knows the
Communists are the bad guys. But if I want my stories to get published
where people will read them, I need to find the exceptions." The
problem was that, after reading his stories, people at home started
questioning what they "knew" about American troops and our enemies,
and in the end, in my view, he and many of his colleagues contributed to
the loss of the war. Robert Elegant has written a great short article on
this problem. 13
If a journalist stole the formula for Coca Cola and published it, the
First Amendment would not protect him from civil and criminal liability.
One might argue that exposing government secrets is different-the
government belongs to us all, and thus no intellectual property rights are
at risk. But publishing national security secrets may well run the risk of
getting good people killed and undermining important activities of the
government we elected. And, not infrequently, the potential harm would
not be apparent to someone who did not understand the details of the
program.
Imagine for a moment that when Canada agreed during the 1979
Iran hostage crisis to covertly assist us in getting American embassy
personnel who had been outside the embassy when it was taken over out
of the country, a journalist learned of the operation. Thinking it would
be the path to a Pulitzer and a new job with bigger bucks, she published
the story in the New York Times or U.S.A. Today. The next day, radical
students in Tehran were in control of the Canadian Embassy-and no
foreign intelligence service was willing to even talk to Americans again.
When the New York Times published a front-page story about the
NSA warrantless wiretap program, and when U.S.A. Today followed
13. Robert Elegant, How to Lose a War: The Press and Viet Nam, Vol. LVII
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with an exclusive of its own reporting that some phone companies were
assisting the government in identifying potential al Qaeda terrorists in
our midst by so-called "data mining" (comparing phone records to
determine which phone numbers had been in frequent contact with other
numbers known or believed by the government to be used by foreign
terrorists), they did the country a great disservice. As I explain in the
above-referenced testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, both
programs were fully consistent with existing judicial precedents; and I
haven't found any serious person who believes it is a bad idea for our
government to try to identify foreign terrorists in our midst. (Not a
single member of the Judiciary Committee argued during the two
hearings where I testified that we ought not be monitoring these
communications.) In 2002, the FISA Court of Review, set up by
Congress to consider appeals from the FISA Court and composed of
federal appeals court judges, unanimously declared that Congress could
not take away the President's constitutional power to authorize foreign
intelligence intercepts by mere statute. Only a constitutional amendment
can do that.
Imagine for a moment what would have happened if some of our
modem journalists had been around during World War II and had
learned that we had broken the German and Japanese codes? Talk about
a Pulitzer story! Then our enemies would have quickly changed their
codes, and if we weren't all speaking German or Japanese today we can
at least be confident that many of us would not be here because our
fathers or grandfathers would not have made it back home alive. For
even if we had eventually won the war it would have taken years longer.
Congress passed a law attaching criminal penalties to reporting
classified information near the end of the Clinton Administration, but
under pressure from CNN and the major media, President Clinton vetoed
it. Politicians rely on journalists to stay in business. Make a friend in the
media and voters may hear about all of the wonderful things you do.
Anger the media, and you may pay a price. Few members of Congress
seem to understand that, while it is true that most journalists they deal
with are "patriotic" and "Americans," not everyone who reads their
stories falls into that camp. Some of the most important intelligence
available about this country can be found in the pages of the New York
Times, the Congressional Record, and Aviation Week & Space
Technology. Most of it is not even classified, but some of it is. (I
remember when a report of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence inadvertently disclosed that we were monitoring
communications between Communist guerrillas in a Central American
1614 [Vol. 33:5
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country, and almost immediately they abandoned their means of
communications and switched to high-tech burst transmitters
(presumably provided by the East Germans) and one-time code pads that
contain no internal logic and thus cannot be broken.)
This, in my view, is a very serious problem, and attaching criminal
penalties to the knowing publication of properly classified government
secrets is a great idea. I recognize that such laws might have a chilling
effect upon press disclosures of governmental wrongdoing. But there are
lots of avenues for redress for any government employee who has access
to classified information and believes criminal or otherwise wrongful
activities are occurring. Between 1981 and 1984 I worked in the White
House as Counsel to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. Any
employee of the IC who believed something illegal was taking place had
a right to come see me, and the agency heads, generals counsel, and
inspectors general had an obligation pursuant to Executive Order 12,334
to bring any such matters to my attention. The small board I served had
direct access to the President on very short notice.
Candidly, I didn't see a lot of serious "abuse" during that period.
Most of the people I dealt with were dedicated public servants with very
strong senses of honor and propriety. Even during the Church and Pike
hearings of 1976 (and as a Senate staff member I sat through some of
them), the case for abuse was in my view overstated. For example, the
Church Committee released a massive report on the issue of CIA
"assassinations," and anyone who bothered to actually read it (as I did)
discovered that the lengthy investigation did not produce a single name
of anyone who had ever been "assassinated" by the CIA. To be sure,
they found several plots to kill Fidel Castro (motivated by requests from
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy), and one other plot to kill an
African revolutionary (Patrice Lumumba) who was killed by his
domestic rivals before the CIA could put its plan into operation. There
were lots of other allegations, but the Committee found them without
merit. And before the hearings even began, Directors of Central
Intelligence Richard Helms and William Colby (an old friend of mine
and frequent guest lecturer in one of my seminars) had issued internal
CIA regulations prohibiting any involvement in assassination.
What would happen if President Bush actually directed the NSA to
monitor the phone conversations of Senators Ted Kennedy and John
Kerry? Certainly at least one of the one hundred employees in the NSA
Inspector General's office would report the violations to someone. And
if the government then tried to punish a "leaker" for making that story
public, what are the odds that a jury would find them guilty? But there is
2007] 1615
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no evidence that such abuse is going on, and if it did occur the internal
executive branch checks are sufficient to deal with the problem.
Harm is done by leaks-often far greater harm than the "leaker"
realizes. There is no constitutional right to disclose government secrets,
few modern journalists seem to be able to resist the lure of fame and
fortune that comes from publishing such material, and the easiest
solution is to attach strong criminal penalties to such behavior and then
enforce those laws.
10. What is the most important question in national security law
today?
How do we educate the American people about these issues? For
we can't win our wars and our national security policies are likely to fail
in the long run without the support of the people. And when people are
told that detaining enemy combatants without giving them a day in court
is illegal, and that it is a crime for the President to authorize the NSA to
monitor communications between known or suspected foreign terrorists
abroad and people within this country, it quite understandably makes
them mad. No one wants the President to be a "lawbreaker," and there is
great partisan profit to be gained from denouncing an incumbent from
the opposite party as a "liar" and a "crook." (The Republicans did it to
Truman in 1950, the Democrats paid them back during Vietnam, and the
game has gone on-with only a brief respite following 9/11-since
then.)
14
On the other side of this coin is the problem of the real
"lawbreaking" that has been going on. That includes the inhumane
treatment of detainees, and a variety of congressional acts pursuant to
laws that are clearly unconstitutional. (The problem of congressional
lawbreaking is a serious one. In the years since the 1983 Supreme Court
INS v. Chadha decision declaring legislative vetoes unconstitutional,
Congress has enacted hundreds of new unconstitutional legislative vetoes
without an apparent second thought.)
So if I had a magic wand and could make all things better, high on
my list would be educating the public about the relevant laws, and in the
process educating government servants as well. I suspect some of the
war criminals who abused al Qaeda detainees had no idea what they were
doing was unlawful, and the result saddens me.
I would try to educate everyone involved about the importance of
14. See Robert F. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitution: Debunking the
"Imperial President" Myth, 19 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL. 533 (1996).
1616 [Vol. 33:5
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upholding the rule of law. It is very much in our interest to do so. And if
we decide that we are so powerful that we need no longer be concerned
about our laws and legal obligations, we will have little chance of
gaining and maintaining the support of people of goodwill around the
globe. And without that understanding and support, I have serious
doubts about whether we can in the end prevail. Put simply, we can't do
it alone.
13
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